Bounds in Bank Regulation by Kim, Sung Eun (Summer)
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2695161 
 
 




      Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 2015-93 
 
 
Bounds in Bank Regulation 
 
Sung Eun (Summer) Kim 
skim@law.uci.edu 









                     
The paper can be downloaded free of charge from SSRN at: 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695161
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2695161 
DRAFT (forthcoming in the Yale Law Journal Forum) 
1 
 
Bounds in Bank Regulation 
Sung Eun (Summer) Kim1 
In his recent essay, Bounded Institutions,2 Yair Listokin examines bounded and unbounded structures 
as two alternative designs for principals to delegate regulatory authority to their agents.3 Bounds refer to 
numerical or quantifiable limitations that are set by the principal on some dimension of the agent’s decision-
making process, and include caps, quotas or grading curves.4 Listokin shows that bounds can be used to 
reach ideal regulatory outcomes even in cases where the principal is uninformed and the agent is biased.  
In this Response, I extend the logic and intuition of Listokin’s bounded institutions to banking, an area 
where information gaps and biases are pervasive yet bounded structures are not prevalent. For instance, in 
the debate about the right size of financial institutions, while there is consensus that a certain number of 
financial institutions have become too big (and thus too-big-to-fail), there is much that remains to be agreed 
regarding the right size of such institutions and how that ideal should be reached. Likewise, while there is 
broad recognition that there are accuracy and accountability issues in the ratings process of financial 
institutions, how this regulatory ratings process can be improved and how progress can be measured are 
open questions that are being debated.  
I suggest here that the numerical and quantifiable feature of bounds such as quotas and curves can offer 
a concrete solution to both of these and other regulatory puzzles in banking. I make the argument that more 
bounds can and should be used in bank regulation, first, by showing that the banking environment satisfies 
the theoretical conditions for bounded structures, and second, by examining the ways in which the special 
features of bounds can help solve the urgent challenges in bank regulation. 
I. How Do Bounded Institutions Work in Banking? 
This Part provides the basic framework. Who are the relevant actors? In Listokin’s model, there is a 
superior body (the principal, or P), a subordinate body (the agent, or A), and the regulated subjects (or S) 
who are affected by the principal and agent’s decisions.5 The principal relies on the agent to observe and 
allocate benefits to the subjects according to the quality of the subjects. In banking, Congress enacted the 
National Bank Act and the National Currency Act in 1863, the former to create a new class of national 
banks and the latter to form the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), which was charged with 
                                                          
1 Assistant Professor of Law, University of California, Irvine, School of Law. Email: skim@law.uci.edu. I am grateful 
to Michele Goodwin and to Arden Rowell for helpful discussions; to Lisa Junghahn and Jackie Woodside of the 
University of California, Irvine, Law Library and to Kate Poorbaugh for research assistance; to Joe Masterman, David 
Simins and Mike Clemente of the Yale Law Journal for editorial assistance; and to Yair Listokin and the Yale Law 
Journal for this opportunity and forum to engage in these discussions. 
2 Yair Listokin, Bounded Institutions, 124 YALE L.J. 336 (2014).  
3 The terms ‘principal’ and ‘agent’ are used herein to refer to the principal-agent relationship that arises when one 
person (the ‘principal’) manifests assent to another person (its ‘agent’) acting on the principal’s behalf and subject to 
the principal’s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents to such an arrangement. For a formal 
definition of agency, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006).  
4 Bounds are distinguishable from rules in that bounds require agents to compare subjects to each other. Rules, on the 
other hand, specify ex ante how agent should regulate subjects based on subject-specific factual characteristics. See 
Listokin, supra note 2, at 350-351. 
5 Id. at 346 tbl. 1. 
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the chartering and supervision of these national banks.6 Throughout this Response, I will refer to Congress 
as the principal, the OCC as its agent, and the national banks supervised by the OCC as the subjects.7 
 
The remainder of this Part examines how well the bank regulatory environment fits with the conditions 
Listokin identifies as ideal for the use of bounded structures.8 Listokin recommends the use of bounds when: 
(1) there is a large number of subjects, (2) there is little variation among subject quality, (3) the agent is 
prone to bias and error, and (4) there are limitations to the practicability of rules.9  
(1) Large number of subjects. By the end of 2014, the OCC oversaw a total of 1,663 financial 
institutions, which included 39 large banks, 36 mid-size banks, 1,077 community banks, 49 federal branches, 
and 462 federal savings associations.10 Although the total number of regulated institutions has fluctuated 
from year to year, the total assets of the subjects that are regulated by the OCC have grown consistently 
over the past ten years (See Table 1). This trend aligns with the overall trend of growth throughout the 
financial sector, which has continuously expanded over the past thirty years, whether expressed as the 
financial sector’s share of gross domestic product (GDP), the quantity of financial assets, employment, or 
average wages.11  
 
  
                                                          
6 This view that regulatory agencies act as agents of Congress has been articulated elsewhere. See e.g., Richard L. 
Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1140 (1990) 
(“Congress, the principal, delegates certain functions to its agent, the administrative agency, expecting that benefits 
will accrue to it through this delegation.”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory 
Reform, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 50-51 (1994) (“The relationship between Congress and an administrative agency might 
be accurately characterized in hierarchical terms: Congress acts, as a principal, to control the actions of its agency-
agent”).  
7 While alternative formulations are possible (for example, the subjects could be bank regulations rather than the 
regulated banks, and the agent could be the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or the Federal Reserve, both of 
which also oversee different aspects of banking), I will use the above designation as the basic framework throughout 
this Response. The scope of this Response is limited to U.S. federal regulation of banks, and the implications of the 
dual (federal and state) banking structure or transnational financial regulation on the bounded institutions construct is 
outside of the scope of this Response. 
8 For an application of the framework to the National Science Foundation (NSF), see Listokin, supra note 2, at 356-
361. 
9 Id. at 341.  
10 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 
2014 (2014). 
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Table 1. Number and Size of OCC-regulated banks12 
Year Number of Institutions Assets ($trillions) 
2005 1,933 5.8 
2010 1,487 8.5 
2014 1,663 10.9 
 
 
(2) Little variation among subjects. Non-financial firms can be created for any legal purpose and take 
myriad forms. Banks, on the other hand, are limited by statute to one or more of three core banking functions: 
receiving deposits, paying checks, or lending money.13 And even among financial firms, banks tend to be 
more homogenous. This homogeneity is largely a result of regulatory design. Activity restrictions and other 
limitations placed on national banks, together with federal preemption rules meant to ensure uniformity, 
make it exceedingly difficult for banks to operate in ways that depart too far from the norm.14  
(3) Agents prone to bias and error. Bias and error have specific meanings in Listokin’s model. Bias 
refers to the tendency of an agent to systematically place a higher or lower value on a subject than the 
principal would perceive (if it had the opportunity to directly observe the subject’s quality),15 and error 
refers to when the agent allocates more or less to the subject than the principal thinks the subject deserves.16 
Fads in science are one source of bias and error that Listokin discusses in his application of bounded 
structures to the National Science Foundation (NSF), which could be analogized to bubbles in finance.17 
Bubbles in finance arise when a particular asset is traded at a price significantly above its intrinsic value, 
and are fueled by over-optimistic perceptions of value (bias) of and the disproportionate allocations of 
resources (error) to such asset class. For example, the housing bubble that was pointed to as one of the 
fundamental causes of the 2007-2009 financial crisis was created as a result of over-optimistic projections 
of value in the housing sector, and related regulatory policies and market responses that over-stimulated the 
mortgage and mortgage-backed securities markets.18  
Another source of bias in financial regulation are boundary problems, which exist when regulatory 
boundaries are drawn according to outdated notions of the risks, activities, and actors that they aim to 
regulate.19 While some boundary problems are inevitable because of the pace of financial innovation and 
the intentional efforts of financial institutions to operate outside of regulatory boundaries, others can be 
                                                          
12 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 
2014 (2014); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, ANNUAL REPORT: 
FISCAL YEAR 2010 at 2 (2010); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
ANNUAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2005 at 7 (2005).  
13 12 C.F.R § 5.20(e)(1) (2015).  
14 Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
677, 678 (1988) (“Federal preemption and uniformity, rather than competition and diversity, are the legal norms in 
banking regulation.”).  
15 Listokin, supra note 2, at 344  
16 Id. at 345 
17 For a discussion of financial laws’ inability to prevent bubbles and mitigate destruction after bubbles pop, see ERIK 
F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION (2014). 
18 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT xv-xxvii (2011). 
19 MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER, ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF FINANCIAL REGULATION 10 (2009) (“There 
are two aspects of the boundary problem; the shift of activity to unregulated players; and the use of financial 
engineering to enable given capital to support more credit.”) 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695161
DRAFT (forthcoming in the Yale Law Journal Forum) 
4 
 
attributed to ill-fitting regulatory design. For example, in my most recent work, I have described the ways 
in which the traditional institution-based approach to financial regulation has exacerbated regulatory biases 
and error (as defined by Listokin) in the regulation of leveraged loans.20  
(4) Limitations on practicability of rules. Listokin explains that bounds are especially useful in settings 
where it is difficult to devise rules to guide the agent.21 Whether or not rule-based guides are feasible depend 
on the availability and reliability of proxies.22 While banking is an area where rule-based policies are widely 
used, the reliability of the proxies used to administer rule-based policies has come into question in the 
aftermath of the recent financial crisis.23 Numerous accounts of the financial crisis describe the ways in 
which proxies such as the credit scores of borrowers, credit ratings of securitized financial products, and 
regulatory assessments of the quality of capital held by eventually failed financial institutions grossly 
underrepresented the degree of risk in our financial system. 24  It was such misunderstandings of the 
magnitude of risk that catalyzed a crisis for which no one was prepared.25  
More importantly, the key difference between rules and bounds is that rules are indifferent to the 
allocation among subjects. 26  Under a rule-based system, so long as a subject satisfies the specified 
conditions, its status and treatment are unaffected by the performance of its peers. This feature of rules 
makes them less suitable for banking regulation in this post-crisis period where there is renewed focus on 
interconnectedness among institutions, and recognition that an understanding of where banks stand in 
relation to one another is critically important to systemic risk regulation.27  
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the banking environment satisfies the four theoretical 
conditions identified by Listokin as ideal for the application of bounds. Part II of this Response examines 
why there are nonetheless so few bounds in banking, given their seeming fit, and Part III goes on to explore 
two specific contexts where the promise of bounds in banking could be realized.  
  
                                                          
20 See Sung Eun (Summer) Kim, Managing Regulatory Blindspots: A Case Study of Leveraged Loans, 32 YALE J. ON 
REG. 89, 107-108 (2015) (highlighting the boundary problems in the regulation of leveraged loans). 
21 See Listokin, supra note 2, at 364-65. For a discussion of the distinction between bounds and rules as regulatory 
strategies, see supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
22 See Listokin, supra note 2, at 364-65. 
23 For instance, the IMF’s Fiscal Affairs Department and Offices in Europe recently organized a workshop titled “The 
Future of Rules-Based Fiscal Policy” to discuss whether the current rules-based approach to guide financial policies 
has become “too complex to effectively guide policy makers, and too opaque to anchor expectations and be credible 
in the eyes of public opinion?” IMF Fiscal Affairs Department Workshop on “The Future of Rules-Based Fiscal 
Policy,” INT’L MONETARY FUND (2015), 
http://www.imf.org/external/region/eur/rr/2015/Agenda_Brussels_042915.pdf [http://perma.cc/9CLF-RZZS]. 
24 For a survey of this literature, see Andrew W. Lo, Reading About the Financial Crisis: A Twenty-One-Book Review, 
50 J. OF ECON. LITERATURE 151 (2012). 
25 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION, supra note 19, at xv-xxvii (describing red flags that were missed by 
regulators in the years leading up to the 2007-2009 financial crisis). 
26 See Listokin, supra note 2, at 351. 
27 See Kristin N. Johnson, Macroprudential Regulation: A Sustainable Approach to Regulating Financial Markets, 
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 881, 887 (2013); Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262 (2013); Steven 
L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L. J. 193, 206 (2008). 
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II. Why Are There So Few Bounds in Banking?  
If banking provides a theoretically ideal environment for bounds, one might expect to see bounds being 
widely used in bank regulation. However, much of bank regulation is presently rules-based.28 Listokin 
explains that there are some areas where bounded structures are not workable because of the idiosyncratic 
or unexpected nature of the regulated subjects’ needs.29 One such example is regulation that deals with 
large-scale and rare disasters (such as catastrophic hurricanes) where the inability of bounds to flexibly 
adapt to variations could actually lead to bad outcomes. Another is defense spending, which is expensive 
and less predictable and where the transaction costs of passing additional bills are high.30 Should banking 
also be added to this short list of sectors that are incompatible with bounds? In this Part, I explore some 
possible explanations for the scarcity of bounds in banking but also refute the notion that such explanations 
preclude the use of bounds in banking altogether.  
Agent independence. One structural feature of bank regulation that could make implementing bounds 
more challenging is the fact that the agencies that regulate financial institutions are independent agencies.31 
The OCC is organized as an independent bureau of the U.S. Department of Treasury, and does not receive 
any appropriations from Congress. 32  In 2014, about 97% of the OCC’s operations was funded by 
semiannual assessments levied on national banks and federal savings associations, with the remainder 
coming from the OCC’s investments and other income.33 This structural feature of the OCC could limit the 
efficacy of bounds if it means that the principal lacks the authority to constrain, including through the use 
of bounds, its agent.  
However, the independent and self-funded status of the OCC does not mean that it is insulated from 
any congressional control. Congress could exercise control over and implement bounds on the OCC by 
exercising its power to (i) amend the National Bank Act, (ii) request evaluations, investigations, and audits 
via the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and (iii) set the scope and standard of judicial review of 
agency actions.34 And Listokin makes clear that bounds encompass more than just presidential oversight 
and congressional appropriations; they include other avenues of control such as regulatory budgets, 
resource constraints, and even cost-benefit analysis. 35 Cost-benefit analysis in particular has taken an 
expanded role in many areas of financial regulation.36  
                                                          
28 See e.g., Dan Awrey, Regulating Financial Innovation: A More Principles-Based Proposal?, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. 
FIN. & COM. L. 273, 282 (2011) (referring to the “historically predominant rules-based approaches toward financial 
regulation”); John H. Walsh, Institution-Based Financial Regulation: A Third Paradigm, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 381, 
381 (2008) (explaining how U.S. financial regulation is rules-based).  
29 Listokin, supra note 2, at 341-342 and 378-79. 
30 Id. at 378-79. 
31 For a discussion of how regulators of financial institutions are independent agencies that are also exempt from 
congressional appropriations, see Note, Independence, Congressional Weakness, and the Importance of Appointment: 
The Impact of Combining Budgetary Autonomy with Removal Protection, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1822, 1823 n.12 (2012).  
32 About the OCC, OFF. COMPTROLLER CURRENCY, http://www.occ.gov/about/what-we-do/mission/index-
about.html [http://perma.cc/Z5L8-HV72]. 
33  FY 2016 Budget-in-Brief: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), U.S. DEP’T TREASURY (2015), 
http://www.treasury.gov/about/budget-performance/budget-in-
brief/Documents/22.%20OCC%20FY%202016%20BIB%20Final.pdf [http://perma.cc/7NHD-GX2R]. 
34 For a discussion of each such powers, see §§ 7:21, 7:24, 12.10 of 3 CHARLES H. KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE (3d ed. 2010 & Supp. 2015). 
35 Listokin, supra note 2, at 368-69. 
36 Cf. John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial Regulation: Case Studies and Implications, 124 YALE 
L.J. 882 (2015) (describing the challenges to cost-benefit analysis for financial regulation). Following the 
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Type of risk. Another characteristic of banking that could explain the absence of bounds is the type of 
risks that pervade the banking sector. Bank regulation, like hurricane regulation, also protects against 
infrequent and destructive events. Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff’s account of the past eight hundred 
years of banking crises has confirmed the inevitability and cyclicality of such large-scale crises.37  
But financial crises, unlike floods or earthquakes and other force majeure events, are human-made and 
thus are theoretically preventable, or at least controllable. And much of bank regulation is also about the 
ordinary course of banking, such as regulating entry and exit, defining the scope of permissible activities, 
and the supervision of the management and information systems used to monitor risk. Recognizing that the 
nature of banking risks ranges from the extraordinary to ordinary,38 bounds could selectively be applied to 
the kinds of risks and decisions that fluctuate less from year to year.  
Information gaps. Another possible explanation for why bounds are infrequently used is the information 
asymmetry or gap between what is known by the principal versus what is known by the agent with respect 
to the quality of the subjects.39 As Listokin explains: “when the principal has more uncertainty regarding 
the distribution of quality within the population, bounded institutions become less attractive relative to 
unbounded institutions.”40 In the context of banking, Roberta Romano has written about the challenges of 
financial regulators who must regulate in the face of unavailability of key information, a dynamically 
changing environment, and uncertainty. 41  Under such conditions, how can Congress intelligently set 
bounds to constrain the OCC if it does not have any superior information with respect to the quality of the 
regulated subjects?  
While no crystal ball exists, records of past information and the benefit of hindsight are available to 
Congress, and it is this history and backlog of information that is needed to set and test bounds in bank 
regulation. And to the extent there are gaps in Congress’s knowledge, the use of bounds can be one way to 
actually force information from both the regulated banks and bank regulators up to Congress so that it can 
set the proper bounds.42 Furthermore, the information required to design bounds in bank regulation comes 
from not only the agents and subject banks, but also from the debt and equity markets (such as stock prices, 
trading volume, and default frequencies) that have also been shown to be accurate predictors of bank 
                                                          
publication of Coates’ article, the Yale Law Journal Forum published a collection of responses (and Coates’ reply 
thereto). This collection of writings is available at 124 YALE L.J. F. 246, 246-315 (2015). 
37 CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 
(2009). For a discussion of how to legitimize bailouts in light of their inevitability, see Adam J. Levitin, In Defense of 
Bailouts, 99 GEO. L.J. 435 (2011). 
38 For a survey of the principal supervisory strategies used by financial regulators to regulate risks, see Howell E. 
Jackson, Regulation in a Multisectored Financial Services Industry, 77 WASH. U. L. Q. 319, 339-63 (1999). 
39 See Listokin, supra note 2, at 362. 
40 Id. 
41 Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. 
REGULATION (Cary Coglianese ed., 2012).  
42 One recent example of such consensus building is the New York Department of Financial Services (NYDFS)’s 
recently held public hearings on the regulation of virtual currencies that were held in January 2014, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TZW7R7FPIJY, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4_M736FgdY, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6EPzoxTAcAI, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8Z3-DA7aFCU, and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=poMdKtU9aRk. Following the January 2014 hearings, NYDFS released its 
proposed “BitLicense” regulatory framework for New York virtual currency businesses, available at 
http://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press2014/pr1407171-vc.pdf (a further revised version of the regulations were released 
in February 2015 and are available at http://www.dfs.ny.gov/legal/regulations/revised_vc_regulation.pdf).  
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failures and successes. 43  And the newly created Office of Financial Research (OFR) was formed 
specifically for the purpose of gathering and disseminating information that can be used as regulatory inputs 
in the design and implementation of bounds.44 
III. What Might Bounds Look Like in Banking?  
Comparing banking data and trends with Listokin’s model in Part I suggests that banks could be fertile 
ground for the use of bounds. And the discussion in Part II demonstrates that while barriers exist, they are 
not insurmountable. This last Part offers a preliminary sketch of what bounds might look like in banking 
regulation by offering two examples. The first is a statutorily set quota on the chartering authority of the 
OCC and the second is a statutorily set curve on the ratings of OCC-supervised banks. I first describe the 
institutional setting for each, then discuss the strengths of using bounds to address the acute problems in 
that particular setting. I will also address possible counterarguments.  
A. Bounds and the Issuance of National Bank Charters 
In this sub-Part, I discuss the possible use of bounds in the administration of one of the main levers of 
bank regulation: the OCC’s licensing function. No entity in the United States can operate as a national bank 
without an OCC-approved charter.45 And unlike with corporate charters where the role of the secretary of 
state is purely ministerial, the role of the regulator in reviewing and granting of applications is much more 
than ministerial.46 A positive or negative outcome of a charter application depends on whether the OCC 
finds that there is a “reasonable chance that the bank will succeed and that [it] will be operated in a safe and 
sound manner.”47 If a charter application fails, the applicant may bring a judicial challenge, but the standard 
of review in that case is the most deferential standard, which asks whether the OCC’s decision was 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”48  
This gatekeeping function of the OCC has created a circularity problem in the later stages of the bank 
regulatory cycle: the regulator who initially determines that a bank is likely to be successful at the licensing 
stage also is tasked with the decision of whether or not to close that same bank in the event of its distress. 
The dynamics of self-preservation and blame avoidance may lead the regulator to become invested in the 
subjects’ success and display a tendency to “oversave” the banks it oversees.49 In addition, the fact that 
almost all of the OCC’s budget comes from the assessments and fees collected from supervised institutions 
raises a conflict of interest in the chartering process by incentivizing the agent to grant more charters than 
may otherwise be optimal (“overbank”).  
                                                          
43 For a survey of the academic literature and an account of bank regulators’ efforts to incorporate market signals into 
bank supervision, see Timothy J. Curry et al., Using Market Information to Help Identify Distressed Institutions: A 
Regulatory Perspective, 15 FDIC BANKING REV., no. 3, 2003, at 1.  
44 About the OFR, OFFICE OF FINANCIAL RESEARCH, http://financialresearch.gov/about/ [http://perma.cc/5NWM-
GBZ9].  
45 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(b) (2015) (describing licensing requirements). 
46 Cf. MODEL BUS. CORP.ACT § 1.25(d) (2010) (describing the secretary of state’s filing of the corporate charter as a 
ministerial task.) 
47 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(f) (2015). 
48 Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (per curium).  
49 Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial 
Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 915-16 (2011) (describing the conflict of interest between supervisory duties and 
budgetary concerns arising from the funding structure). 
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Bounds could provide a solution to the problems of overbanking and oversaving in the bank chartering 
process. A statutorily set quota50 could act as an upper bound on the presently quantitatively unfettered 
discretion of the OCC in this decision to open banks. Congress would still rely on the OCC’s expertise to 
determine whether an applicant deserves a charter (or a receiver should be appointed), but could protect 
against any tendencies of the agent to oversave or overbank by using bounds to limit the size and 
crowdedness of the sector.51  
The strength of bounds such as the quota contemplated here is that they force these discussions to 
happen ex ante and create a binding mechanism that will not be eroded by the problems of circularity and 
conflict of interests in bank regulation. However, implementing bounds does not come without costs. A 
quota, if reached, will keep any and all entrants out, regardless of their desert or merit. And if a prospective 
entrant is kept out because there are no longer any seats left at the table, we might be worried about two 
separate problems. Not only is this an unfair result for the applicant, but it could also cause those who 
already have a seat at the now-full table to become complacent. However, a quota is meant to force the 
agent to face these kinds of difficult scenarios, which prioritize systemic considerations above individual 
institutional concerns, and evaluate fairness from the perspective of the entire banking sector and not just 
from that of the prospective entrant or incumbent. Moreover, regulating entry is easier and less costly than 
ex post intervention in a crowded, overheated banking market. 52  Furthermore, banking is a dynamic 
industry, where there are multiple forced and natural departures, creating frequent opportunities for new 
entrants to enter the banking industry by assuming a closed bank’s deposits.53 
But, what if the quota is too high? Too low? Or impossible to change when it needs to be updated? 
These questions about the appropriate level and administration of a quota go to an assessment of the “right 
size” of the banking sector that will have to be answered whether or not we have bounds.54 And once a 
consensus regarding these open questions has been reached, bounds-based regulations will be an effective 
way to credibly commit to the agreed upon limits.  
B. Bounds and Regulatory Ratings 
In this sub-Part, I discuss the possible use of bounds in the OCC’s regulatory ratings system. While 
much attention has been paid to credit ratings agencies (CRAs) and how to fix the broken pieces of that 
                                                          
50 The constitutionality of Congress’ power to charter national banks (as within its power to regulate interstate 
commerce) was upheld in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
51 The Federal Reserve Board’s recently finalized rule limiting bank mergers or acquisitions if the liabilities of the 
combined entity will exceed more than 10% of the liabilities in the financial system is a move in this direction. The 
final rule (also referred to as Regulation XX or the “Concentration Limit on Large Financial Companies”) was 
issued by the Federal Reserve Board on November 4, 2015 to implement section 622 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act, and is available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-11-14/html/2014-
26747.htm.  
52 Not only are more examinations conducted as part of the licensing process, the OCC has also made clear that de 
novo banks are more intensively monitored and closely supervised. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, BANK 
SUPERVISION PROCESS: COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, 11-12 (September 2007, last updated October 2014) 
[hereinafter COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK].  
53 The OCC grants a shelf charter to prospective acquirers for this specific purpose.  
54 See generally Gary H. Stern & Ron Feldman, Addressing TBTF by Shrinking Financial Institutions: An Initial 
Assessment, FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS: THE REGION (June 1, 2009), 
https://www.minneapolisfed.org/publications/the-region/addressing-tbtf-by-shrinking-institutions-an-initial-
assessment [http://perma.cc/JD3D-4PLU]; Mark J. Flannery, What To Do About TBTF?, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATL. 
2010 FIN. MARKETS CONF.: UP FROM THE ASHES: THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AFTER THE CRISIS (May 12, 2010), 
https://www.frbatlanta.org/documents/news/conferences/10fmc_flannery.pdf [http://perma.cc/K3B2-3J2D]. 
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regime, 55  not as much has been written about the rating that regulators give to supervised banks. 
Considering that the prescriptions and reform proposals from the CRA critique involve shifting much of 
the work that was previously done by CRAs to the regulators, the time is now ripe to turn our attention to 
the regulatory ratings process.56  
To provide a brief introduction, the OCC uses a “uniform interagency rating system[]” that has been 
jointly adopted by federal bank and thrift regulatory agencies to assign ratings to subjects.57 The CAMELS 
rating, as it is also known, is a composite of six component assessments: capital adequacy, asset quality, 
management capability, earnings quality, liquidity adequacy, and sensitivity to market risk.58 For each 
component of CAMELS, the subject is given a rating ranging from one to five, with a one rating indicating 
the strongest performance and a five being the weakest.59  
The ratings process can best be described as one that is customized to the institution. It takes into 
account each institution’s size and sophistication, the nature and complexity of its activities, and its risk 
profile.60 Further, bank supervision responsibilities are assigned on a bank-by-bank basis, with a dedicated 
commissioned national bank examiner assigned to each examined bank (on a rotation basis).61  
While this regulatory philosophy and approach that values consistency and continuity within each 
subject is important to ensure that the supervisory process identifies risks and deficiencies that are unique 
to an institution, it raises two concerns: one is the lack of comparability of ratings between subjects and 
second is the potential for ratings inflation. A bank given a rating of one will have no way of knowing 
where it stands in relation to its peers because it does not know how many one ratings were given (in the 
extreme case, all banks could have received the same rating). Unlike chartering decisions, which are made 
public, bank regulatory ratings are not disclosed. They are known only to the regulator and the senior 
management of the rated bank. And if regulators over time develop a positive bias towards subjects (also 
referred to as ‘regulatory capture’62), banks may be given a higher rating than the principal would deem 
appropriate, leading to inflation. 
Bounds could provide a solution to the comparability and inflation concerns. In this case, the use of a 
curve would be appropriate. First, the beauty of a curve is that it forces the agent to compare subjects to 
one another. A statutorily set ratings curve would require the OCC to consider all rated subjects before 
determining the ratings assignments. And a curve, by definition, avoids ratings inflation (or deflation for 
                                                          
55 See, e.g., Lynn Bai, On Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry, 13 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS & PUB. 
POL’Y 253 (2010); Robert J. Rhee, On Duopoly and Compensation Games in the Credit Rating Industry, 108 NW. U. 
L. REV. 85 (2013).  
56 For a summary of the sections of the Dodd-Frank Act that require that references to credit ratings be removed from 
statute and regulation, see BAIRD WEBEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41350, THE DODD-FRANK WALL STREET 
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT: ISSUES AND SUMMARY 15-17 (2010).  
57 COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at 9. 
58 Id. 
59 A detailed description of each of the component ratings, including a list of principal evaluation factors as well as a 
description of each numerical rating for each component, can be found in the Comptroller’s Handbook of the bank 
supervision process. Id. at 46-54. 
60 Id. at 9. 
61  Id. at 5 (“Personnel selected for these assignments are rotated periodically to ensure that their supervisory 
perspective remains objective.”).  
62 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. MGM’T SCI. 335, 335-36 (1974) 
(explaining the theory of regulatory capture); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 
3, 4 (1971).  
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that matter). The implementation of a curve would also shed some light on an otherwise opaque practice. 
The presence and disclosure of a curve can help banks understand where they stand relative to their peers 
without the need to know the specific ratings assigned to competitor banks. 
Ranking institutions of various size, geography, risk appetite, etc., according to a single cohesive 
standard is difficult and complex, and requires inevitable judgment calls. 63  Notwithstanding such 
challenges, the benefit of a bound such as a curve (and the planning and design required to implement such 
a bound) is that it can manage the biases and errors of regulators. Furthermore, the regulatory structure 
within the OCC is already set up as a pyramid structure (portfolio managers report to the examiner-in-
charge who then reports to the supervisory office), which lends itself to a process where ratings decisions 
are made by a centralized supervisory body within the agent. Such an effort to centralize would also be 
consistent with the OCC’s commitment to identifying and measuring risk using common definitions and 
common methods of evaluation.64 Lastly, the regulatory ratings procedure is not intended to replace banks’ 
internal models of risk and private ratings organizations’ efforts to generate and maintain tailored and 
sophisticated measures of risk. 
Another challenge to using a curve is its bluntness. For instance, a bank may have scored worse than 
its peers but only by a small margin—and a curve may result in a ratings differential that overstates that 
small margin. This concern is especially compelling given my earlier assessment above of the banking 
sector as one with relative little variability. However, it is precisely this kind of resistance to treating banks 
adversely that has overheated the finance sector.  
One consensus that has emerged from the post-crisis legal and finance literature is the need for 
countercyclical regulation. Countercyclical regulation refers to policies that clamp down during boom 
periods and loosen up during bust periods.65 Countercyclical regulation has two main objectives: the first 
is to prevent the growth of asset bubbles and the second is to require financial institutions to build up 
reserves when times are good.66 Bounds can be used to carry out both those objectives. First, as the national 
bank charter quota example shows, bounds can counteract regulatory inertia toward overbanking by 
imposing limits on the OCC’s chartering authority even during times when there are no obvious or urgent 
deficiencies in the banking sector. Second, as the relative regulatory ratings curve example shows, bounds 
can be used to recognize and reward top performers who outperform their peers (and penalize laggards) 
and to facilitate a race to the top among subjects.  
Conclusion 
 As Listokin articulates in Bounded Institutions, the promise of bounds is that they can be used to reach 
ideal outcomes even when the principal is uninformed and the agent is biased. This has immense appeal for 
banking, where information gaps and biases are pervasive. Another advantage of bounds for bank regulation 
is that they force comparisons among subjects, which is useful for systemic risk regulation. Bounds can 
                                                          
63  The Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR) (https://www.ffiec.gov/ubpr.htm) developed by the Federal 
Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) which publishes peer group average data on banks’ performance 
and balance-sheet composition data since 2003 can be a useful guide in setting the curve and overcoming some of the 
practical challenges of implementing such a curve.  
64 COMPTROLLER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 55, at 19. 
65 On the other hand, pro-cyclical regulation refers to policies that clamp down during bust periods and loosen up 
during boom periods. For a review of ongoing debate over the objectives, tools, and impediments to countercyclical 
regulation, see Patricia A. McCoy, Countercyclical Regulation and its Challenges, BOS. COLL. LAW SCH. DIGITAL 
COMMONS (Feb. 17, 2015), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp/934/ [http://perma.cc/RPF2-5JXA]. 
66 Id. at 2.  
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also be used as a means to credibly commit to countercyclical measures that have recently been proposed 
as an antidote to bubbles in finance. 
While I show in this Response that the banking environment is a theoretically appealing setting for 
bounds, some additional conditions must also be fulfilled for the successful design and implementation of 
bounds in bank regulation. They include the availability of comprehensive and quality data regarding the 
regulated subjects and the principal and agent’s willingness to consider new regulatory strategies. 
Furthermore, it must be recognized that the regulated subjects are not static participants, and the subjects’ 
anticipated response to bounds must be built into the design of the bounds in order for bounded structures 
to reach their desired outcomes. As such, the knowability of the quality and behaviors of the regulated 
subjects by the principal and agent as well as the alignment of goals among principal, agent and the 
regulated subjects are important prerequisites for the realization of the promise of bounds in bank regulation.  
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